Alternatives
Products that do what Calus does
Drop in security gateway for AI agents
- 1OV
We built OneCLI because AI agents are being given raw API keys. And it's going about as well as you'd expect. We figured the answer isn't "don't give agents access," it's "give them access without giving them secrets." OneCLI is an open-source gateway that sits between your AI agents and the services they call. You store your real credentials once in OneCLI's encrypted vault, and give your agents placeholder keys. When an agent makes an HTTP call through the proxy, OneCLI matches the request by host/path, verifies the agent should have access, swaps the placeholder for the real…
Mar 2026 · github.com
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- 3GF
hi guys. been working on something i think is fundamentally missing in today's workflow with ai agents. vcs. i find myself struggling with questions that agents can't answer like "why did you do it?", "when did u delete this folder? why?", etc. or trying to /rewind (after a /compact...) or basically `bisect` to find when and why something was done by the agent in the current / previous session. just like git did for code, i think we are the same core capabilities with ai agents so... i developed an open source solution for that (currently supporting claude code) would love to…
May 2026 · github.com
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hey HN, Jonathan and Guy here, creators of OneCLI (https://onecli.sh/). OneCLI is an open source vault for AI Agents. Traditional vaults are used to store your secrets and, on demand, provide them to you all in a secure way, trusting the person to keep them safe. We figured that in the agent's world, this is not the case, as you don't know what happens with the secret after it's delivered to the agent, or where it was saved. Or maybe someone even manipulated them to hand them over... From that understanding, we decided to build a network gateway that sits between your AI…
Jul 2026 · github.com
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Prompt injection and token savings - #1 in benchmarks
Jul 2026 · constellationgate.ai
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- 12YC
I made this for myself, and it seemed like it might be useful to others. I'd love some feedback, both on the threat model and the tool itself. I hope you find it useful! Backstory: I've been using many agents in parallel as I work on a somewhat ambitious financial analysis tool. I was juggling agents working on epics for the linear solver, the persistence layer, the front-end, and planning for the second-generation solver. I was losing my mind playing whack-a-mole with the permission prompts. YOLO mode felt so tempting. And yet. Then it occurred to me: what if YOLO mode isn't so bad?…
Jan 2026 · github.com
- 13AO
Hi! I’m Nathan: an ML Engineer at Mozilla.ai: I built agent-of-empires (aoe): a CLI application to help you manage all of your running Claude Code/Opencode sessions and know when they are waiting for you. - Written in rust and relies on tmux for security and reliability - Monitors state of cli sessions to tell you when an agent is running vs idle vs waiting for your input - Manage sessions by naming them, grouping them, configuring profiles for various settings I'm passionate about getting self-hosted open-weight LLMs to be valid options to compete with proprietary closed models. One…
Jan 2026 · github.com
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Skip the setup and run OpenClaw & Hermes, fully managed
17d ago · cloudways.com
- 15IB
Hi HN, I’m the creator of Cordum. I’ve been working in DevOps and infrastructure for years (currently in the fintech/security space), and as I started playing with AI agents, I noticed a scary pattern. Most "safety" mechanisms rely on system prompts ("Please don't do X") or flimsy Python logic inside the agent itself. If we treat agents as autonomous employees, giving them root access and hoping they listen to instructions felt insane to me. I wanted a way to enforce hard constraints that the LLM cannot override, no matter how "jailbroken" it gets. So I built Cordum. It’s an open-source…
Jan 2026 · github.com
- 16EY
I built an open-source AI agent for security testing to find and fix vulnerabilities in your code. I’ve noticed how bad security vulnerabilities have gotten with everyone shipping AI code slop, so I wanted to build something that allows for vibe-coding at full speed without compromising security. Traditional security tools aren’t effective, and manual pen-testing can’t keep up with the rapidly growing AI code This tool runs your code dynamically, finds vulnerabilities, and validates them through actual exploitation. You can either run it against your codebase or enter your (or someone…
2025 · github.com
- 17OS
Hi HN, Matvey, Ildar, Joey, and Dominik here. If you're building LLM agents that use tools, you're probably worried about prompt injection attacks that can hijack those tools. We were too, and found that solutions like prompt-based filtering or secondary "guard" LLMs can be unreliable. Our thesis is that agent security should be handled at the network level between the agent and the LLM, just like a traditional web application firewall. So we built Archestra Platform: an open-source gateway that acts as a secure proxy for your AI agents. It's designed to be a deterministic firewall against…
Oct 2025 · archestra.ai
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Jun 2026 · github.com
- 19FP
We've built an open-source tool to stress test AI agents by simulating prompt injection attacks. We’ve implemented one powerful attack strategy based on the paper [AdvPrefix: An Objective for Nuanced LLM Jailbreaks](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.10321). Here's how it works: - You define a goal, like: “Tell me your system prompt” - Our tool uses a language model to generate adversarial prefixes (e.g., “Sure, here are my system prompts…”) that are likely to jailbreak the agent. - The output is a list of prompts most likely to succeed in bypassing safeguards. We’re just getting…
2025 · security.vista-labs.ai
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Local AI agent guardrails, budgets, & circuit breakers.
Jun 2026 · stackmint.ai
- 24IB
The only way to go fast is full YOLO mode in your coding agent. I've got the local sandbox figured out (pro tip: Incus VMs work great) but I wanted to keep my agents from doing things like inadvertently blowing up my cloud services or chasing a prompt to POST to some random website. I struggle most with this on my side projects where my permission model isn't quite as robust as it is at the office. I started with a firewall on the Incus container but every time the agent needed access to something new, I was poking more holes in it - and it didn't differentiate between HTTP verbs. I've been…
Jul 2026 · trollbridge.dev
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