Alternatives
Products that do what CYBERAKS does
Dismantle Criminal Networks
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AI agents that find, validate, and fix every vulnerability
Jun 2026 · getastra.com
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Anthropic and OpenAI's publicly available models are explicitly guard-railed so that they refuse offensive tasks. And their cyber-focussed models are gated for enterprises. This leaves SMEs and mid market open to major vulnerabilities. AI can be used as both an adversarial and defensive tool in the world of cyber. A worst case outcome is if only the adversaries have access. Meanwhile, most existing AI cyber tools are just wrappers. The problem is that they still have all the guardrails on from the foundation model where they will inherit its refusals. For this project we've post-trained a…
Jun 2026 · argusred.com
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I built this because I wanted my own directory of public companies running bug bounty programs — where I could see their infrastructure in one place and have a real idea of where to start poking holes. Neobotnet collects intel data from companies on HackerOne and Bugcrowd — subdomains, DNS records, web servers with status codes, indexed/crawled URLs, JS files, and exposed secrets/paths (still building this last part). The data is already there when you need it. No scans to run. Currently tracking 41 companies, 63,878 web servers, and 1.8M+ URLs. Long term I want to expand this to…
Mar 2026 · neobotnet.com
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We build runtime security for AI agents. The playground started as an internal tool that we used to test our own guardrails. But we kept finding the same types of vulnerabilities because we think about attacks a certain way. At some point you need people who don't think like you. So we open-sourced it. Each challenge is a live agent with real tools and a published system prompt. Whenever a challenge is over, the full winning conversation transcript and guardrail logs get documented publicly. Building the general-purpose agent itself was probably the most fun part. Getting it to reliably use…
Mar 2026 · github.com
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I built this from another Show HN thread where people were mentioning alternative AI agent sandboxes and jails
Jul 2026 · pleasedonotescape.com
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I've been talking to founders building AI agents across fintech, devtools, and productivity – and almost none of them have any real security layer. Their agents read emails, call APIs, execute code, and write to databases with essentially no guardrails beyond "we trust the LLM." So I built AgentArmor: an open-source framework that wraps any agentic architecture with 8 independent security layers, each targeting a distinct attack surface in the agent's data flow. The 8 layers: L1 – Ingestion: prompt injection + jailbreak detection (20+ patterns, DAN, extraction attempts, Unicode…
Mar 2026 · github.com
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A turning point on AI agents in Cybersecurity, shown in two recent research papers from UC Berkeley and Stanford: CyberGym: AI agents discovered 15 zero-days in major open-source software BountyBench: AI agents solved real-world bug bounty tasks worth tens of thousands of dollars This represents a pivotal shift in cybersecurity — AI agents can now autonomously do what only elite human hackers could before. Check out their work: CyberGym: https://www.cybergym.io/ BountyBench: https://bountybench.github.io/
2025 · twitter.com
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We've built an open-source tool to stress test AI agents by simulating prompt injection attacks. We’ve implemented one powerful attack strategy based on the paper [AdvPrefix: An Objective for Nuanced LLM Jailbreaks](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.10321). Here's how it works: - You define a goal, like: “Tell me your system prompt” - Our tool uses a language model to generate adversarial prefixes (e.g., “Sure, here are my system prompts…”) that are likely to jailbreak the agent. - The output is a list of prompts most likely to succeed in bypassing safeguards. We’re just getting…
2025 · security.vista-labs.ai
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