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Alternatives

Products that do what Tired of duct-taping access control into agent prompts. Here's the fix does

  1. 1
    Venn.ai337

    Delegate real work to AI agents with safety guardrails

    Mar 2026

  2. 2
    BU138

    Openclaw in the cloud

    Mar 2026

  3. 3
    Openbase216

    Manage your team of AI agents by voice, from anywhere

    Jul 2026 · openbase.cloud

  4. 4
    CtrlAI104

    Transparent proxy that secures AI agents with guardrails

    Mar 2026

  5. 5FP

    We've built an open-source tool to stress test AI agents by simulating prompt injection attacks. We’ve implemented one powerful attack strategy based on the paper [AdvPrefix: An Objective for Nuanced LLM Jailbreaks](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.10321). Here's how it works: - You define a goal, like: “Tell me your system prompt” - Our tool uses a language model to generate adversarial prefixes (e.g., “Sure, here are my system prompts…”) that are likely to jailbreak the agent. - The output is a list of prompts most likely to succeed in bypassing safeguards. We’re just getting…

    2025 · security.vista-labs.ai

  6. 6IB

    Hi HN, I’m the creator of Cordum. I’ve been working in DevOps and infrastructure for years (currently in the fintech/security space), and as I started playing with AI agents, I noticed a scary pattern. Most "safety" mechanisms rely on system prompts ("Please don't do X") or flimsy Python logic inside the agent itself. If we treat agents as autonomous employees, giving them root access and hoping they listen to instructions felt insane to me. I wanted a way to enforce hard constraints that the LLM cannot override, no matter how "jailbroken" it gets. So I built Cordum. It’s an open-source…

    Jan 2026 · github.com

  7. 7SA
  8. 8OS

    Hi HN, Matvey, Ildar, Joey, and Dominik here. If you're building LLM agents that use tools, you're probably worried about prompt injection attacks that can hijack those tools. We were too, and found that solutions like prompt-based filtering or secondary "guard" LLMs can be unreliable. Our thesis is that agent security should be handled at the network level between the agent and the LLM, just like a traditional web application firewall. So we built Archestra Platform: an open-source gateway that acts as a secure proxy for your AI agents. It's designed to be a deterministic firewall against…

    Oct 2025 · archestra.ai

  9. 9AA
  10. 10

    Access governance for AI agents. Free.

    Apr 2026

  11. 11TO
  12. 12AS

    Apr 2026 · github.com

  13. 13OF

    2025 · github.com

  14. 14

    Solution to AI Agent prompt injection and hijacking attacks

    Apr 2026

  15. 15RA

    Hi HN folks, I have been building AI agents for quite some time now. The shift has gone from LLM + Tools → LLM Workflows → Agent + Tools + Memory, and now we are finally seeing true agency emerge: agents as systems composed of tools, command-line access, fine-grained system capabilities, and memory. This way of building agents is powerful, and I believe it is here to stay. But the real question is: are the systems powering these agents ready for that future? I do not think so. Using Docker for a single agent is not going to scale well, because agents need to be lightweight and fast. LLMs…

    Mar 2026 · github.com

  16. 16

    Your AI agent asks. You decide. From your phone.

    May 2026

  17. 17

    Local security & compliance scanner for AI agents

    Jul 2026 · safeclaude.net

  18. 18

    Open-source security scanner for AI agent memory stores

    Jun 2026 · github.com

  19. 19AP
  20. 20

    Scans AI agent skills for malicious code

    10d ago · github.com

  21. 21
    Calus3

    Drop in security gateway for AI agents

    Jun 2026 · usecalus.com

  22. 22
    Slaunt1

    Control what coding agents can see, do, and execute

    4d ago · slaunt.ai

  23. 23

    Govern AI agents across workspaces, machines, and clouds

    Mar 2026

  24. 24

    Block dangerous AI agent actions before execution

    Jul 2026 · relay-security-lemon.vercel.app

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