Alternatives
Products that do what SCOPE MCP does
A free linter for agent permissions, before they ship.
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- 7RA
Hey HN! A few months ago we shared mcp-agent (https://github.com/lastmile-ai/mcp-agent) [1][2], a lightweight framework that implements every agent pattern from Anthropic’s Building Effective Agents blog [3] and handles MCP server/client management seamlessly. Our core bet is that connecting LLMs to tools, resources, and external systems will soon be MCP-native by default. Today we're launching a significant update: Agents as MCP servers. Currently "agentic" behavior exists only on the MCP client side – clients like Claude or Cursor use MCP servers to solve tasks.…
2025 · github.com
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- 11MF
Hey everyone, I've wanted an easy way to control which mcp server tools are available to clients. So for example, I might want a gmail server to only expose the read tool (but not send, delete etc). I figured if I create a cli for spawning mcp servers, I could intercept the stdin, stdout, stderr etc and modify what the clients see when they are making calls to list tools, resources, and prompts. Well it worked! In the initial version you can easily add a server to claude with a safe list of tools: npx -y mcpgod add @modelcontextprotocol/server-everything --client claude --tools=echo,add…
2025 · github.com
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Wireshark for MCP. A transparent proxy that shows every real tool call between your AI client and your MCP servers, live in your terminal. - kerlenton/mcpsnoop
Jul 2026 · github.com
- 13MS
Hi HN! We kept seeing devs get pwned through MCP tools in ways that security scanners completely miss. So we built an open-source analyzer to catch these attacks. Our first OSS by Mighty team. The problem: At Defcon, we saw MCP exploits with 100% success rate against Claude and Llama. Three attack patterns: Hidden Unicode in "error messages" - Paste a colleague's error into Claude, your SSH keys get exfiltrated Trusted tool updates - That database tool you've used for months? Last week's update added credential theft Tool redefinition - Malicious tool redefines "deploy to prod" to run…
2025 · github.com
- 14MS
2025 · github.com
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I’m the developer behind the Web MCP at Bright Data. We just launched a free tier so any AI Engineer/ Vibe coder can give their LLM real web access — 5,000 requests/month at no cost. Unlike most MCP servers that wrap a single SaaS API (e.g. Gmail, GitHub), the Web MCP wraps the entire internet. It handles JS-heavy sites, auto-solves CAPTCHAs, and returns clean Markdown your model can use. Free tier includes: search_engine → search results from Google/Bing/Yandex scrape_as_markdown → fetch any URL as clean, LLM-friendly Markdown (with CAPTCHA handling) Quick start:…
2025 · github.com
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Many teams connecting LLMs to external tools eventually encounter the same architectural issue: as more tools and agents are added, the integration pattern becomes an N×M mesh of direct connections. Each agent implements its own auth, retries, rate limiting, and logging; each tool needs credentials distributed to multiple places and observability becomes fragmented. We built LLM gateway with this goal to provide a single place to manage authentication, authorization, routing, and observability for MCP servers, with a path toward a more general agent-gateway architecture in the future. The…
Dec 2025 · truefoundry.com
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Hi HN, We’re building security tooling around agentic AI systems. Today, we're releasing our public MCP catalog with detailed risk analysis for every MCP server we've found on the internet: https://mcp.armor1.ai/mcp-directory We all love agents and the power that MCPs unlock: suddenly your AI assistant can query databases, manage files, call APIs, and interact with the real world. But when we started adopting MCPs ourselves, we kept running into the same nagging questions: Is this MCP safe? Where is my data actually going? Could it execute destructive actions? Is it…
Feb 2026 · mcp.armor1.ai
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Dec 2025 · agentdiff.dev
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Hello, HN. I've created fast-agent to make building my own products easier - and remove the friction between defining Prompts, MCP Servers and their composition. It uses a simple, declarative style that's easy to work with and source control - with inbuilt support for the patterns in the Building Effective Agents paper. Because you can "warm-up" and interact with Agents before, during or after the workflows, it's easy to diagnose and tune Agent prompts and behaviour for later runs. Being able to set these workflows up makes LLM Context Management and Tool Selection a lot easier and can…
2025 · github.com
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We’re open-sourcing a simple way to add “canary tools” to AI agents via MCP honeypots. These are functions your agent should never call during normal operation. If a canary is invoked, you get a high-fidelity signal of prompt-injection, tool hijacking, or lateralization—no heuristics, no extra model calls. What it is: - Go framework exposing decoy tools over MCP that look legitimate (names/params/descriptions), return safe dummy output, and emit telemetry when invoked. - Runs alongside your real tools; ship events to stdout/webhook or your pipeline (Prometheus/Grafana,…
Sep 2025
- 23HM
We built a Rust MCP server, which wraps the excellent headless terminal (HT)[1] to makes it available for agentic coding tools. Most agentic coding tools struggle with blocking, interactive terminal tools (all the boilerplate generator, infra CLI tools etc). This is because many existing CLI dev tools are built for humans and require interactive input. We built this so agentic coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Memex, etc) can “see” and “interact” with terminals exactly like humans do. In our demo video [2], you'll see it operating vim/emacs just as a human would - selecting options,…
2025 · github.com
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